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I. INTRODUCTION
The ancillary powers of the Article III federal district courts encompass
far more than adjudicatory authority over factually interdependent civil claims
initially presented within cases or controversies. Ancillary powers are used to
facilitate civil case settlement agreements extending to matters well beyond
any claims initiallypresented for adjudication. Ancillary powers are employed
later in civil actions to adjudicate civil claims presented only after initial
adjudicatory powers have been exercised. And, ancillary powers are exercised
to resolve matters collateral to civil claim resolution, but necessary for the
courts to function successfully. At least some ancillary federal district court
adjudicatory powers, involving factually interdependent civil claims, are now
recognized in the "supplemental jurisdiction" statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
enacted in 1990. The law codifies earlier U.S. Supreme Court precedents on
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. It has been used primarily to govern initial
ancillary adjudicatory authority over state law civil claims without independent
jurisdictional bases (hereinafter "nonfederal claims") that arise from "a
common nucleus of operative facts" as the civil claims with independent
subject matter jurisdictional bases (hereinafter "federal claims"). The statute
does not speak to other ancillary powers. Federal courts are quite baffled at
times regarding these other powers. A new § 1367 could provide at least some
clarity on the ancillary powers where there has been uncertainty and confusion.
While the statute has received mixed reviews on what it addresses, many
ancillary powers remain unaddressed in § 1367 as well as in other statutes and
court rules. This silence is unfortunate because there has been, and there
remains, too much uncertainty and confusion over both the forms and the
exercises of these other ancillary powers.
Section 1367 should be amended to encompass more fully ancillary
federal district court powers, a task facilitated by the 1994 U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America.' In
Kokkonen the Court established a framework for viewing all ancillary powers,
declaring that "ancillary jurisdiction" had two separate "heads": jurisdiction
over "factually interdependent" claims and jurisdiction allowing courts to
"function successfully."2 Section 1367 now provides, at best, only some
guidelines for the ancillary powers over factually interdependent claims.
1. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
2. Id. at 379-80.
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Further guidance is needed, including some articulation of the differences in
the varying forms of ancillary powers. This article will urge amendments to
§ 1367 to expand its reach to cover all ancillary powers, thereby limiting
uncertainty and confusion and providing much needed guidance.
Before exploring possible changes to § 1367, we first review the case
precedents leading to § 1367; the supplemental jurisdiction statute itself and
its failure to address all forms of ancillary power; the later views of the
American Law Institute and others on the statute; the decision in Kokkonen;
and, contemporary illustrations of the uncertainty and confusion over the
ancillary powers that remain unaddressed in § 1367.
II. THE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION STATUTE
A. The Precursors to the Legislation
By codifying certain pendent and ancillary jurisdiction case precedents
within § 1367, Congress in 1990 provided guidelines to the Article III federal
district courts on some of their ancillary adjudicatory powers. The guidelines
were distilled from more than a century of precedents. Yet long before § 1367,
much broader ancillary powers were employed by the Article III federal courts.
These broader ancillary powers extended beyond the initial adjudicatory
authority now found within § 1367 over nonfederal claims that are factually
related to federal claims.' Once recognized as pendent or ancillary claims that
would ordinarily be expected to be tried "in one judicial proceeding,"5 on
factually related claims, § 1367 now speaks of "supplemental" claims. Some
factually related claims, as well as other forms of ancillary powers, however,
remain outside the express ambit of § 1367.
One of the early precedents on ancillary federal district court powers was
the 1860 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Freeman v. Howe.6 There the Court
3. To date, the legal commentators, Congressand the American LawInstitute have not gonebeyond
some factually interdependent claims in discussing § 1367 reform. See, e.g., Peter Raven-Hansen, The
Forgotten Proviso of § 1367(b) (And Why We Forgot), 74 IND. L.J. 197, 197 (1998) (upon reviewing the
discussion, findingthe speakers "have left nothingnew for anyone to sayabout supplemental jurisdiction").
4. Civil claims in these settings often are distinguished by the characterizations of nonfederal
claims and federal claims, with the former including factually interdependent claims. Owen Equip. &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 n. 11 (1978). These terms can be confusing since federal claims
can include claims grounded on state law as long as there is diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under a
statute such as 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) (discussing general diversity).
5. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
6. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 460-61 (1860).
2003]
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
recognized federal adjudicatory authority over "ancillary and dependent"
claims under state law presented by an intervenor who did not meet the
diversity of citizenship requirements.' In doing so, the Court clarified
misunderstandings arising from earlier rulings on ancillary powers wherein
only original plaintiffs were mentioned! It extended ancillary adjudicatory
powers beyond civil claims presented by original plaintiffs. In 1926, the Court
in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange9 recognized that similar ancillary
adjudicatory power could be exercised over a factually related counterclaim
even though there was "no independent basis of jurisdiction."'" Seven years
later in Hum v. Oursler," the Court set forth some general principles on such
ancillary adjudicatory powers. Hum had sued Oursler in a federal court for
copyright infringement, alleging Oursler's play infringed upon Hum's
copyrighted work. In addition to a federal copyright claim, Hum presented
state law claims based on unfairness. 2 The federal trial court found no
copyright infringement and then concluded it could not resolve the state law
claims as they were outside the general diversity statute. The Supreme Court
reversed, in part, finding that
where two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged, one only of
which presents a federal question, [i.e., has an independent basis of jurisdiction] and...
where the federal question averred is not plainly wanting in substance, the federal court,
even though the federal ground be not established, may nevertheless retain and dispose
of the case upon the non-federal ground.... "
The Court acknowledged that there were conflicting precedents, resulting in
confusion. 4 This demonstrated "the importance of attempting to formulate
some rule on the subject."' 5 The chosen rule was based upon a distinction
"between a case where two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of
action are alleged, one only of which presents a federal question, and a case
7. Freeman, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 460 (precedent limiting ancillary powers to original parties "was
probably not intended").
8. The complete diversity requirement of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, (1806)
continues under the present general diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000), though minimal diversity
is all that is needed under one special diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2000) (certain interpleader
actions).
9. Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
10. Id. at 608.,
11. Hum v. Oursier, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
12. Id. at 239 (citing "unfair business practices and unfair competition").
13. Id. at 246.
14. Id. at 240-41.
15. Id. at 241.
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where two separate and distinct causes of action are alleged, one only of which
is federal in character."16 Only in the former could there be exercised ancillary
federal court adjudicatory power. In Hum, the federal copyright ground was
accompanied by a state unfairness ground, forming one cause ofactionbecause
the two grounds "so precisely rest upon identical facts as to be little more than
the equivalent of different epithets to characterize the same group of
circumstances."' 7 By contrast, a state law claim in Hum that Oursler's play
infringed upon an "uncopyrighted version" of a play by Hum was deemed a
"separate and distinct" cause of action.'"
The Hum analysis, involving distinct grounds and distinct causes of
action, proved difficult to apply and caused continuing confusion.'9 In 1966,
in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, the Court shed the analysis in
Hum because it had been "the source of considerable confusion"" and
endorsed a "pendent" jurisdiction analysis.2' In Gibbs, the Court said that
pendent jurisdiction,
in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a claim "arising under [the]
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,"
... and the relationship between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that
the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional "case." '2
The Court elaborated, saying that "if, considered without regard to their federal
or state character, a plaintiffs claims are such that he would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming
substantiality of the federal issues, there ispower in federal courts to hear the
whole."23 The Court lookedto the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on joinder,
finding their impulse is to promote "judicial economy and fairness to parties,"24
although recognizing the rules "do not expand the jurisdiction of federal
16. Id. at 246.
17. Id. See also id. at 240 ("same acts" which are "inseparable").
18. Id. at 248.
19. See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349 (1988) ("The [Hum] test for
determining when a federal court had jurisdiction over such state-law claims was murky, however, and the
lower courts experienced considerable difficulty in applying it") and George B. Fraser, Ancillary
Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 33 F.RD. 27, 45 (1963) (ancillary
jurisdiction is "the child of necessity and the sire of confusion").
20. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724.
21. Id. at 725-29.
22. Id. at 725.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 724.
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courts."25 The Court elaborated, sayingthe rules "embody 'the whole tendency
... to require a plaintiff to try his.., whole case at one time'.. . and to that
extent emphasize the basis of pendent jurisdiction. 2 6 In Gibbs, all the civil
claims were subject to ancillary adjudicatory powers because they were found
to "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact."27 These ancillary powers
were then found to have been properly employed under the guidelines
recognized for discretionary exercises of these powers.28
Ancillary adjudicatory powers over factually related nonfederal claims
were again addressed in 1976 in Aldinger v. Howard.29 There the Court was
asked whether the Gibbs precedent allowed pendent-party jurisdiction,
extending beyond nonfederal claims between existing parties who were all
already subject to some independent federal jurisdictional basis, to include new
parties over whom there was no independent jurisdictional basis.3" The Court
held that Gibbs could extend to such claims so long as the trial court could
"satisfy itself not only that Art. III permits it, but that Congress in the statutes
conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication negated its
existence."'" However, the Court held that in the case before it, the factually
related claims against a new party, a county, though arising out of a "common
nucleus of operative fact,"32 could not be adjudicated in a federal civil action
against others who were sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court reasoned
that the county was expressly insulated from § 1983 liability because it was not
a "person" under the statute33 and thus Congress "by implication" had
foreclosed any use of ancillary adjudicatory powers over the county.34
In 1989 in Finley v. United States,35 the Court again restricted pendent-
party jurisdiction. In that case a widow sued a utility company and the City of
25. Id.at725n.13.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 725, 728-29. For a review of the relationship between the varying pronouncements in
Gibbs, see Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case ": Procedural Rules and the
Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1399 (1983).
28. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 728-29. The Gibbs guidelines were codified and placed in § 1367 in 1990.
28 U.S.C. 1367(c). The guidelines are nowsaid by the U.S. Supreme Court to involve considering at every
stage of litigation "the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." City of Chicago
v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997).
29. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
30. Id. at 6.
31. Id. at 18.
32. Id. at 14-19.
33. Id. at 16.
34. Id. at 19.
35. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
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San Diego on state law grounds after her husband and children were killed
when a plane crashed into power lines.36 She also sued the United States under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that the negligence of a federal agency
contributed to the crash.37 In holding there was no pendent-party jurisdiction
over the nonfederal claims against the utility company and the city, the Court
said that "with respect to the addition of parties, as opposed to the addition of
only claims, we will not assume that the full constitutional power has been
congressionally authorized, andwill not read jurisdictional statutes broadly."38
The Court acknowledged that in some settings, federal district courts may have
ancillary powers over pendent-parties.39 Such powers were available, for
example, to a court where necessary to give effect to a court decree or to
dispose of property within its exclusive control.4" In refusing to recognize
ancillary powers, as in Aldinger, the Court in Finley emphasized legislative
intent.4' It found that no congressional act supplied pendent-party jurisdiction
over the widow's nonfederal claims. The Court also noted that its precedents
had never held that ancillary powers over factually related nonfederal claims
were always available.42
The judicial precedents leading to § 1367 do not provide clear guidelines
for exercises of ancillary adjudicatory powers over factually related nonfederal
claims that are free of "confusion' ' 3 or that display "an entirely consistent
approach."'44 They do suggest that the Gibbs precedent generally permits,
36. Id. at 546.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 549.
39. Id. at 550 (where statutes expressly authorize such powers).
40. Id. at 551. The Court cited two civil cases where the trial court may find it appropriate to
exercise jurisdiction over pendent parties "when necessary to give effect to the court's judgment." Id. See
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 238-39 (1934) (stating that the claim in the second suit against the
employer based on a pre-bankruptcy assignment of wages is "ancillary and dependent" to employee's
bankruptcy in first suit). The Court cited two other cases where "an additional party has a claim upon
contested assets within the court's exclusive control." Finley, 490 U.S. at 551. See Krippendorfv. Hyde,
110 U.S. 276, 282 (1884) (explaining that where one creditor seeks debt recovery by attaching in federal
court the alleged debtor's property held by a third person, the federalcourt may adjudicate claims involving
the property presented by the third party and by other creditors of the same debtor, as they are "ancillary
and dependent, supplementary merely to an original suit out of which" the claims arose; such proceedings
involve "the inherent and equitable powers of the court in auxiliary and dependent proceedings incidental
to the cause in which the property is held").
41. Finley, 490 U.S. at 552-56 (explaining that the relevant statute allowing suits against the United
States does not include private defendants and its subject matterjurisdiction statutory partner mentions only
suits against the United States, meaning suits against no one else).
42. Id.at551.
43. Hum, 289 U.S. at 240-41.
44. Finley, 490 U.S. at 556 (stating, "[a]s we noted at the outset, our cases do not display an entirely
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under the federal constitution, ancillary adjudicatory power over a nonfederal
claim that is factually related to a claim over which an independent subject
matter jurisdiction basis is, or has been, recognized already. And, they
recognize that such power is subject to congressional veto.45 As well, they
recognize that through statute, possible exercises of ancillary powers over
pendent parties can require that factually related nonfederal claims do a little
more than satisfy the Gibbs common nucleus test4 6 or can be recognized by
Congress in "an affirmative grant of pendent-party jurisdiction."'47 Thus, while
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, effective only after opportunity for
congressional review, continually maintain their "impulse" to promote
"judicial economy and fairness to parties," '4 the decisional precedents prior to
§ 1367 anticipate that under federal statutes "the efficiency and convenience
of a consolidated action [involving all factually related claims] will sometimes
have to be foregone in favor of separate actions in state and federal courts." 9
B. The History and Language of the Statute
Within the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,0 Congress codified many
of the precedents on ancillary adjudicatory powers over factually related
nonfederal claims in § 1367," though it employed a new term, "supplemental
jurisdiction," and overrode the decision in Finley. At the time, some legal
scholars anticipated significant problems, many of which could have been
avoided had Congress followed a more traditional legislative process. Since
then, problems have surfaced and criticisms of § 1367 have continued. 2
consistent approach with respect to the necessity that jurisdiction [over factually interdependent claims]
be explicitly conferred").
45. Id. at 556 (acknowledgingthat"[w]hatever we say regarding the scope ofjurisdiction con ferred
by a particular statute can of course be changed by Congress").
46. Id. at 551.
47. Id. at 553-55.
48. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724.
49. Finley, 490 U.S. at 555-56.
50. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089.
51. While speaking only to subject matter jurisdiction over "claims" rather than to powers over
issues that are exercised at anytime during the course of, or even after a judgment in, a civil action,
fortunately § 1367 covers all "related" claims rather than only claims that "derive from a common nucleus
of operative fact" per Gibbs. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), Gibbs, 353 U.S. at 725. Cf. Wendy Collins Perdue, The
New Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute-Flawed But Fixable, 41 EMORY L.J. 69, 70 (1992) (preferring
"common nucleus" language rather than the broader language now in § 1367(a)).
52. Among the early critics were Professors Thomas C. Arthur and Richard D. Freer. See Thomas
C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws: The Disaster of the Supplemental Jurisdiction
Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963 (1991) [hereinafter Arthur & Freer, Burnt Straws]; Richard D. Freer,
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The Judicial Improvements Act was designed to alleviate excessive costs
and delays in federal litigation. The relevant Senate Report identified two
main problems with the Article III federal court system: scarcity of resources
and spiraling court costs." The report cited a 1987 survey showing that 71%
of Americans believed the overall cost of a lawsuit was too high.54 In addition,
it found many federal courts were uncertain about the boundaries of ancillary
powers over factually related claims.5 The Senate Report suggested that the
supplemental jurisdiction proposal in Title I of the Act provided a means to
promote greater efficiency and clarity. 6 Senator Grassley asserted that
allowing federal courts to resolve civil claims outside their original subject
matter jurisdiction, but factually related to claims within such jurisdiction,
allowed the courts to "deal economically-in single rather than multiple
litigations-with related matters."' In addition to supplemental jurisdiction,
the Act expanded the number of federal district judges, provided additional
protections for intellectual property rights, and established the National
Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal.5"
The remaining legislative record for the 1990 Judicial Improvements Act
almost exclusively embodies reports and discussions about the additional
Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction
Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445 (1991) (hereinafter Freer, Compounding Confusion]. Other academics joined
the debate in the pages of that journal. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Debate Over § 1367: Defining
the Power to Define Federal Judicial Power, 41 EMORY L.J. 13 (1992); Karen Nelson Moore, The
Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute: An Important But Controversial Supplement to Federal Jurisdiction,
41 EMORY L.J. 31 (1992); Perdue, supra note 51; Joan Steinman, Section 1367-Another Party Heard
From, 41 EMORY L.J. 85 (1992). Later works on § 1367 are referenced in John B. Oakley, Prospectusfor
the American Law Institute's Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855,936-43
(1998) [hereinafter Oakley, Prospectus]. Professor Oakley reviews the major debated statutory questions
in Oakley, Prospectus, supra, at 936-45.
While most critics have focused on the failure of§ 1367 to promote fully or intelligently the goals of
intersystem judicial economy and efficiency and consistency of result, at least one critic finds the law
carries the "potential to upset the constitutional allocation of power between federal and state courts." C.
Douglas Floyd, The ALl, Supplemental Jurisdiction, and the Federal Constitutional Case, 1995 BYU L.
REv. 819, 827.
53. S. REP. No. 101-416, at 1-2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6804.
54. Id. at 6.
55. Id. at 28.
56. Id. at 29 (fills the statutory gap noted in the Finley case).
57. 136 CONG. REc. S17,580 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
58. See id. 905-18 (statement of Sen. Biden). Many believed the changes to be rather benign.
Senator Grassley noted that "[tihe changes proposed by this amendment today, however, represent only
those consensus items that enjoyed unanimous support among study committee members. Taken
individually, these changes are quite modest. Collectively, I believe these changes will substantially
improve the administration of justice in the Federal system." Id. at S17 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
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judgeships. As the only senator to mention Title I, Senator Grassley described
it as containing "a number of noncontroversial and somewhat technical
recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee."" The Senate
Judiciary Committee did not specifically discuss the proposed § 1367 and the
Senate passed it as part of the larger omnibus legislation.6" At the time, legal
scholars complained they had little opportunity to review and critique the
proposal.6  While acknowledging there had been Federal Court Study
Committee hearings, some argued that the proposed § 1367 was significantly
different than the proposals discussed at those hearings. 62 Later, the Reporter
for the Federal Judicial Code Revision Project (Project) of the American Law
Institute (ALl) noted problems caused by the "hurried circumstances" under
which § 1367 was passed.63
C. The Aftermath
1. Difficulties in Interpretation
With the passage of § 1367, critics predicted that troublesome and
unintended consequences would follow.64 Professors Thomas Arthur and
Richard Freer were among the early critics. They concluded that the statute,
as a whole, would encourage rather than reduce civil litigation expense and
delay.65 For instance, they found the class action language may have
inadvertently abrogated the ruling in Zahn v. International Paper66 that
59. Id. at S17, 578 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
60. Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Close Enough for Government Work: What Happens
When Congress Doesn 'tDo Its Job, 40 EMORY L.J. 1007, 1013 n.34 (1991) [hereinafter Arthur & Freer,
Close Enough].
61. See id. at 1013; Christopher M. Fairman, Abdication to Academia: The Case of the
Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 157, 159 (1994) (arguing
that Congress's lack of oversight during the drafting process led to a statute with "undesirable effects").
62. Arthur & Freer, Close Enough, supra note 60, at 1013 n.35.
63. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT, TENTATIVE
DRAFT No. 1, at 21 (1997) [hereinafter ALI TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1]. The Judicial Improvements Act of
1990 is comprehensively reviewed by the Reporter, John Oakley, in John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory
Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of 1988 and
1990,24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 735 (1991).
64. See Arthur & Freer, Close Enough, supra note 60, at 1008-09. But see Patrick D. Murphy, A
Federal Practitioner's Guide to Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 78 MARO. L. REV.
973, 1038 (1995) (praising the drafters of§ 1367 fordoing "an admirablejob ofcreating, in a lucid fashion,
an organized and useful codification" of "pendent, ancillary and pendent-party jurisdiction").
65. Arthur & Freer, Close Enough, supra note 60, at 1012.
66. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
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disallows in diversity jurisdiction "claims by class members that do not satisfy
the amount in controversy requirement." 7 Fbrther, they characterized the
statutory approach to factually related claims involving intervenors as yielding
"confusion."6
Other scholars joined in dissent. While acknowledging the new statute
provided some clarity, Professor Martin Redish found that § 1367 was
"plagued with problems, ambiguity, and controversy."69  Professor John
Oakley, now the reporter for the ALl Project, advocated greater coordination
between state and federal court jurisdiction in light of the "unclear"
jurisdictional rules within the statute that were "subject to manipulation."7
In defense of § 1367, its drafters,7' Professors Stephen Burbank, Thomas
Rowe, and Thomas Mengler, wrote a series of essays.72 They found that
§ 1367 clarifies and alters the decision in Finley v. United States,13 thereby
promoting more efficient adjudication of cases under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. 74 They said this alone justifies the statute.75 They admitted that "[t]he
statute is concededly not perfect, '76 but found that it provides "basic
67. Arthur& Freer, Close Enough, supra note 60, at 1008. The federal circuits have since split on
whether § 1367 overrides Zahn. See, e.g., Rosmer v. Pfizer Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 117 (4th Cir. 2001)
("§ 1367 plainly does not require that all class members must independently meet the amount in
controversy requirement of § 1332.") and In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[U]nder
§ 1367 a district court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over members of a class, although they did
not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement."), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom Free v.
Abbott Labs., 529 U.S. 333 (2000).
68. See Arthur & Freer, Close Enough, supra note 60, at 1011.
69. Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal
Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles, "78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1817 (1992).
70. John B. Oakley, The Future Relationship of California 's State and Federal Courts: An Essay
on Jurisdictional Reform, the Transformation of Property, and the New Age of Information, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2233, 2236 (1993).
71. Thomas M. Mengler et al., Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation to Codify
Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 JUDICATURE 213, 216 (1991).
72. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., A Coda on SupplementalJurisdiction, 40 EMORY L.J. 993
(1991) [hereinafter Rowe et al., Coda]; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et aL, Compounding or Creating Confusion
About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943 (1991) [hereinafter
Rowe et al., A Reply].
73. Finley, 490 U.S. at 556 (holding that plaintiffs suing the federal government under the Federal
Tort Claims Act could not join a private party defendant unless the plaintiff could show an independent
federal jurisdiction base).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000).
75. Rowe et al., A Reply, supra note 72, at 945.
76. Id. at 961.
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guidance."77 They placed trust in the federal courts "to interpret the statute
sensibly."78
In contemplating § 1367, the drafters did not consider inclusion of all
ancillary federal district court powers, including those that help the courts
function successfully. In seeking to implement a noncontroversial
recommendation of the Federal Courts Study Committee, the drafters sought
to craft a statute that did not involve such complex business that it would be
"too prolix and baroque for everyday use and application by practitioners and
judges."79 Congressional omission of other ancillary powers from § 1367 may
also be partially attributable to the state of U.S. Supreme Court precedents in
1990. The broader perspective in the Kokkonen precedent came some time
later. Omission may also have been grounded on a desire for common law
development. Whatever the reasons, the continuing failure to include all forms
of ancillary powers in § 1367 is unfortunate as confusion and uncertainty
continue. Since Kokkonen was decided in 1994, its view of the two heads of
ancillary jurisdiction has been significantly overlooked. Federal lawmakers
have failed to seize the opportunity to promote more fully the primary goals of
§ 1367, namely judicial economy, clarity and the reduction of unnecessary
costs in civil litigation, by amending the statute to reflect more fully the
Kokkonen analysis.
2. The American Law Institute Proposals
Since Kokkonen, the ALI has examined § 1367 through its Federal Judicial
Code Revision Project. In 1994, it asked Professor John Oakley to draft "a
prospectus for a project to revise the Judicial Code, for possible enactment by
Congress."8 Professor Oakley initially proposed that the ALI "undertake on
a modular and serial basis to reform (1) supplemental and diversity
jurisdiction; (2) venue and transfers of venue; and (3) removal jurisdiction and
procedure."'" Since then Professor Oakley has overseen the ALI discussion of
possible § 1367 reforms. s2
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. One question of interpretation recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court involved the
relationship of § 1367(d) to a state defendant given the Eleventh Amendment. Raygor v. Regents of the
Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002) (holding that § 1367 does not toll a statute of limitations for claims
against nonconsenting states that are filed in federal court and later dismissed).
80. ALI TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 63, at xv; Oakley, Prospectus, supra note 52, at 861.
81. ALl TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 63, at xvi.
82. While the ALI Council tentatively decided in 1995 "to proceed with the project along the general
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Early on, Professor Oakley identified several areas ripe for amendment.
He expressed concern with both the scope of supplemental jurisdiction and
with the standards for its discretionary use.83 On scope, Professor Oakley
proposed that law reformers better consider the "claim specific" way in which
the federal district courts determine subject matter jurisdiction.84 While
statutes typically grant subject matterjurisdiction over certain types of actions,
he found that federal district courts typically adjudicate on a "claim-specific
rather than action-specific basis, with the law of supplemental jurisdiction
functioning in the background."" Professor Oakley also urged that there be
greater limitations on the judicial discretion under § 1367 over certain factually
related nonfederal claims, including "compulsory counterclaims, cross-claims,
claims by intervenors as of right, and claims for indemnity or contribution from
third parties," as there should be no invitation to discard longstanding U.S.
Supreme Court precedents. 6 But, he supported continuing "discretion in the
exercise of what used to be called 'pendent' jurisdiction along the lines
discussed in the leading case of United Mine Workers ofAmerica v. Gibbs." 7
Finally, Professor Oakley urged that supplemental jurisdiction be expanded to
embrace additional parties and that the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
be "more-or-less presumptive in federal-question litigation." '
Professor Oakley's suggestions within the ALI Project have changed over
time in response to input from ALI members. Thus, as a result of the 1997
Annual Meeting, Professor Oakley revised a draft of suggested changes. 9 A
new draft, now approved, retains the "claim-specific" concept,9 ° but eliminates
certain proposals involving discretionary exercises of supplemental
jurisdiction.91
lines.., proposed in the prospectus," since then the preferred approach and its particulars have changed
after consultations with AU members. Id. at xvi-xvii. The Institute approved on May 14, 1998, Tentative
Draft No. 2. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT TENTATIVE
DRAFT No. 2 (Apr. 14, 1998) [hereinafter ALl TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2] (approving black-letter and
comments, but not annotations). The Project history is recounted in John B. Oakley, Integrating
Supplemental Jurisdiction and Diversity Jurisdiction: A Progress Report on the Work of the American
Law Institute, 74 IND. L.J. 25, 27-44 (1998).
83. Id. at xxii.
84. Id. at xvii.
85. ALITENTATIVEDRAFTNO. 1, supra note 63, at xviii.
86. Id. at xix.
87. Id.
88. Id. at xx.
89. ALl TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 82, at xxiii.
90. Id. at xv.
91. Id. at xxiii. A draft was adopted by the Institute on May 14, 1998.
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The ALI proposals on § 1367, like the statute itself, fail to acknowledge
all forms of ancillary federal district court powers. The omission is deliberate,
as the Institute at the outset limited Professor Oakley's work to "clarification
and rectification of the 'technical' provisions of the law governing federal
jurisdiction," directing him to avoid "politically divisive 'macro' topics."'92
In more theoretical writings, Professor Oakley has described Article III
federal district court subject matter jurisdiction as encompassing three tiers:
the constitutional tier, the statutory tier, and the decisional tier.93 The
interaction of these tiers is said to form a laminate that is interwoven and
overlapping, with the courts simultaneously employing all tiers in determining
jurisdictional issues. This description fits all forms of ancillary federal district
court power. All ancillary powers can be viewed with a similar laminate. And
they all are guided chiefly by concerns for judicial economy, efficiency and
justice. These similarities are not politically divisive.
92. ALITENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 63, at xv. ProfessorOakley, in response to input from
Institute members, included thoughts on both technical and theoretical changes. Id. at xxii-xxiii. For an
interesting critique of the AL work, see Floyd, supra note 52, at 844 ("The relationship that historically
had sustained the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over nonjurisdictional claims by and against additional
parties had been one of logical dependence or the necessity to resolve an entire lawsuit between parties
already properly before the court, rather than simply the factual overlap and considerations of judicial
economy that undergird the ALI proposal."). A recent Indiana Law Journal symposium also commented
on the Tentative Drafts. See Richard D. Freer, Toward a Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental
Jurisdiction in Diversity of Citizenship Cases, 74 IND. L.J. 5 (1998) (proposing that among the broad
changes considered for § 1367, the drafters should reassess the limited scope of supplemental jurisdiction
in diversity cases); Arthur D. Wolf, Comment on the Supplemental-Jurisdiction Statute: 28 U.S. C.
§ 1367, 74 IND. L.J. 223 (1998) (recommending that the drafters consider whether or not the discretionary
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367 is an unconstitutional delegation of Congress's power
to determine jurisdiction of lower federal courts); David L. Shapiro, Supplemental Jurisdiction: A
Confession, an Avoidance, and a Proposal, 74 IND. L.J. 211 (1998) [hereinafter Shapiro, A Confession]
(recounting the unexpected results of the Finley decision and arguing that refinement of the current
supplemental jurisdiction statute is better left to the courts) [hereinafter Shapiro, A Confession]; Peter
Raven-Hansen, The Forgotten Proviso of 1367(b) (And Why We Forgot), 74 IND. L.J. 197 (1998) (arguing
that the limitations of § 1367(b) to cases "when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims
would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332" is an underused judicial tool
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over several types of cases, including "plaintiffs who are claimed
against from asserting essentially defensive counterclaims, cross-claims or third-party claims against
nondiverse parties"); Graham C. Lilly, Making Sense ofNonsense: Reforming Supplemental Jurisdiction,
74 IND. L.J. 181 (1998) (proposing that, as an alternative to the Strawbridge v. Curtiss complete diversity
requirement, the drafters should urge a requirement for a "substantial core (or 'freestanding') diversity
claim; once jurisdiction is attached to this claim, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would operate
routinely").
93. ALI TENTATIVE DRAF T No. 1, supra note 63, at 36-43.
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To counter the complexity, "often to the point of bafflement," 4 of
integrating the tiers on ancillary adjudicatory powers over some factually
related civil claims, the ALl has set forth a revised § 1367." If there is also
"bafflement" with respect to the other ancillary powers, where the tiers are
similarly integrated and there exist no political divisions, should further
revisions to § 1367 be pursued? Perhaps not, if any changes to § 1367 would
necessarily entail a "complex business," making any revision "too prolix and
baroque for everydayuse and application by practitioners and judges. '96 While
we find that all ancillary federal district court powers present issues of great
complexity, we also find that the supplemental jurisdiction issues now
addressed in § 1367 are no less complex than other ancillary power issues. We
find there is comparable "bafflement" about all forms of ancillary power so
that revisions seeking at least "to perpetuate rather than repudiate" the
decisional tier would be helpful.97 And, we find such revisions can be readily
accomplished through use of the analysis in Kokkonen. We next explore more
fully the varying forms of ancillary federal district court power; illustrate
bafflements; and, suggest how the analysis in Kokkonen provides a helpful
base for statutory revisions which perpetuate, yet do not repudiate, the
decisional tier on all ancillary federal district court powers.
III. GAPS IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION STATUTE: THE OTHER
HEAD OF ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
A. The Two Heads ofAncillary Jurisdiction
Beyond initial adjudicatory authority over factually related nonfederal
claims now addressed in § 1367, the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized
other forms of ancillary federal district court powers. In 1994, in Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Insurance Co. ofAmerica, these powers were nicely described. 98
- The case involved parties who settled a federal diversity action. While the trial
judge heard the agreement and dismissed the case under the civil procedure
94. Id. at 43.
95. ALI TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 82, at 1-4. Professor Oakley also reviews the major
statutory and policy questions arising under the present § 1367 in Oakley, Prospectus, supra note 52, at
936-45. Professors Edward Hartnett and John B. Oakley authored a recent colloquy on whether the revised
ALI proposal touches the Owen Equipment case ruling. Colloquy, Supplemental Jurisdiction, the ALl, and
the Rule of the Kroger Case, 51 DUKE L.J. 647 (2001).
96. Rowe et al.,A Reply, supra note 72, at 961.
97. ALI TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 63, at 45.
98. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
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rule on voluntary dismissals, the judge did not incorporate, or even mention,
any of the settlement terms in the dismissal order. The settlement provided
that Kokkonen return to Guardian certain documents relating to his work as an
insurance agent for Guardian.99 When Kokkonen allegedly violated the terms
of the settlement, Guardian sought judicial enforcement. While the lower
courts ordered the documents returned, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous
decision, reversed, finding there was no subject matter jurisdiction in the
federal district court.' ° It said: "Neither the Rule nor any provision of law
provides for jurisdiction of the court over disputes arising out of an agreement
that produces the stipulation"'0 ' of voluntary dismissal. In the absence of a
statutory basis for subject matter jurisdiction, the Court noted its case
precedents recognized "ancillary jurisdiction ... for two, separate, though
sometimes related purposes: (1) to permit disposition by a single court of
claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent...
and (2) to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its
proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees."'0 2 In the case,
neither purpose was applicable, though the district court likely would have
been able to exercise ancillary jurisdiction "if the parties' obligation to comply
with the terms of the settlement agreement had been made part of the order of
dismissal."'0 3
The Kokkonen analysis demonstrates the gaps in the current supplemental
jurisdiction statute. The Judicial Improvements Act, through the new § 1367,
was intended to promote the consolidation of factually related claims in a
single federal case in order to improve judicial efficiency while reducing civil
litigation expenses. Yet, the Act does not address ancillary enforcement power
that would have been available in Kokkonen under a different court order on
the very same settlement. Similarly, explicit statutory recognition of the
ancillary powers necessary for federal courts to function successfully would
promote greater efficiency and economy as well as educate parties, lawyers
and judges about the types and exercises ofjudicial powers that extend beyond
initial adjudicatory authority. Clarification is necessary as much confusion
remains today, especially over the second head of ancillary jurisdiction that
involves successful court functioning. Amendments to § 1367 that are in line
99. Id. at 377.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 378.




with the Kokkonen analysis would help reduce existing "bafflement" and
promote uniformity, while also perpetuating existing decisional tiers.
B. The Baffling Uncertainties Surrounding Ancillary Jurisdiction
In the absence of written guidelines in § 1367 or elsewhere, there are
uncertainties about ancillary federal district court jurisdiction extending
beyond initial adjudicatory power over factually interdependent claims. Some
of this uncertainty is attributable to confusion over terminology. °4 Before the
supplemental jurisdiction statute was enacted, both "ancillary"jurisdiction and
"pendent" jurisdiction, including "pendent-claim jurisdiction" and "pendent-
party jurisdiction," were the terms chiefly employed in judicial precedents to
describe initial ancillary power over "factually interdependent" claims. These
terms were never authoritatively defined.0 5 Since 1990, federal courts have
continued to refer to "ancillary," "pendent," "pendent-claim" and "pendent-
party" jurisdiction and use pre-1990 cases when initially adjudicating factually
related claims. Perhaps this is because § 1367 is viewed as mostly codifying
earlier precedents.'0 6 Often, courts today make no express reference to § 1367
or to the phrase "supplemental" jurisdiction. Even the U.S. Supreme Court in
Kokkonen employed terms other than supplemental jurisdiction in describing
ancillary adjudicatory powers over factually related claims.'0 7 In apparent
104. Reliance on general ancillary powers alone, without any attempt to distinguish their varying
forms, would only serve to obscure analysis. See, e.g., Societe Internationale pour Participations
Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958) (discussing the best approach to
inherent judicial power analysis).
105. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365,370 n.8 (1978) ("No more than
in Aldinger ... is it necessary to determine here "whether there are any 'principled' differences between
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction; or, if there are, what effect Gibbs had on such differences."); Finley v.
United States, 490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989).
We may assume, without deciding, that the constitutional criterion for pendent-party jurisdiction
is analogous to the constitutional criterion for pendent-claim jurisdiction . . . . Our cases show,
however, that with respect to the addition of parties, as opposed to the addition of only claims, we
will not assume that the full constitutional power has been congressionally authorized, and will not
read jurisdictional statutes broadly.
106. See, e.g., Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379-80; Herrick Co. v. SCS Communications, Inc., 251 F.3d
315 (2d Cir. 2001); and Rosmer v. Pfizer Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 113-29 (4th Cir. 2001).
107. In Kokkonen, the Court did not mention 28 U.S.C. § 1367 when finding there was no factually
interdependent claim within "ancillary jurisdiction," 511 U.S. at 380, after describing how the trial court
had employed its "inherent power" and the appellate court had referenced "inherent supervisory power" in
recognizing that enforcement authority was available to the insurer, id. at 377. After Kokkonen, the
Supreme Court has referenced Kokkonen in speaking of ancillary jurisdiction involving factually
interdependent claims, again without citing to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 or mentioning supplemental jurisdiction.
Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1996); see also City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522
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recognition of contemporary uncertainties about appropriate terminology, the
ALl considered, for awhile, a proposal to revive and clarify distinctions
between pendent and ancillary claims, providing detailed definitions for
each. '0 Yet even without further amendment, the current supplemental
jurisdiction statute at least provides an opportunity for a singular approach to
initial adjudicatory power, though today § 1367 does not define or otherwise
speak to other ancillary powers. Here too there is "bafflement" and a similar
need for a singular source.
Under Kokkonen, there are ancillary powers necessary for courts to
function successfully, including powers to "manage" court proceedings, to
"vindicate" judicial authority, and to "effectuate" court decrees. 10 9 Not
infrequently, these powers, though employed, go unmentioned. Additionally,
uncertainties, prompted by the little guidance provided in written laws or
elsewhere on the discretion during the exercise of these powers, trigger at
times standardless discretionary judicial acts."0 Some uncertainties can be
traced to continuing disagreements within the U.S. Supreme Court over the
ancillary powers appropriate for successful court functioning. The Justices
have struggled, for example, with locating "acts which occurred in connection
with" civil litigation that might prompt the ancillary vindication powers' and
with articulating the circumstances when statutes or court rules may "limit the
exercise" of such powers." 2 Yet much uncertainty could be reduced by
broadening § 1367 to encompass all forms of ancillary power, even if generally
described. This expansion should not make the statute overly complicated or
U.S. 156, 171-72 (1997) (referring to "pendant jurisdiction" even after referencing § 1367).
108. ALl TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 63, at 5 provides:
1. a pendent claim is a claim for relief, other than a freestanding claim, that is joined in the
complaint in a civil action and is part of the same case or controversy as a freestanding claim to
which the pendent claim has been joined in the complaint;
2. an ancillary claim is a claim for relief, other than a freestanding claim or a pendent claim, that
has been joined to the same civil action and is part of the same case or controversy as a freestanding
claim.
That proposal has been eliminated by the adoption of ALl Tentative Draft No. 2. ALl TENTATIVE DRAFT
No. 2, supra note 82, at 1.
109. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.
110. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 68 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 76 (noting apparent disagreement with the majority on whether prelitigation acts of bad
faith in a contract setting can trigger sanctions in the trial court).
112. Compare id. at 47-48 n. 12 (declaring the Court has never classified the inherent powers doctrine
by tiers, founded on the types of congressional authority available to limit the doctrine, and finding "no
need to do so now") with id. at 64 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Despite the Court's suggestion to the contrary
... our cases recognize that Rules and statutes limit the exercise of inherent authority.").
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"too prolix and baroque for everyday use."" 3 It will promote needed clarity to
a confusing body of terms and precedents and should not be "politically
divisive."' "
Congress should also distinguish between the different heads of ancillary
jurisdiction in § 1367 because it can help guide trial courts on the types of
procedures that must be used. For instance, in Kokkonen, assuming that the
settlement agreement had been incorporated into the final decree, the trial court
would have been able to proceed upon an alleged breach in any one of four
ways: criminal contempt, coercive civil contempt, compensatory civil
contempt, or contract enforcement. The type of proceeding is important
because it determines the "applicability of federal constitutional
protections.""' 5 However, determining whether proper procedures were
employed is increasingly difficult because "in the codified laws of contempt
... the 'civil' and 'criminal' labels... have become increasingly blurred."" ' 6
As well, at times, trial courts do not clearly express the intentions underlying
the procedures they employ when examining court orders that are disobeyed.
Differentiations between varying ancillary powers in § 1367 would sensitize
all to the importance of articulating goals when alleged violations of court
orders are judicially explored.
If the court's main goal in examining Kokkonen's acts is to vindicate its
own authority, then the "function successfully" prong of Kokkonen and
criminal contempt procedures seem most appropriate. The need for correlation
between the goal(s) sought and the character of the proceeding is well-
established." 7 The U.S. Supreme Court thus has distinguished between
criminal and civil contempt proceedings by stating: "If it is for civil contempt
the punishment is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is
for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the
court.'" When a trial court mischaracterizes the nature of a contempt hearing
and employs deficient procedures, challenges may be made."9
113. See supra note 70.
114. See supra note 81.
115. Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 630 (1988).
116. Id. at 631.
117. Id. ("The question of how a court determines whether to classify the relief imposed in a given
proceeding as civil or criminal in nature, for the purposes of applying the Due Process Clause and other
provisions of the Constitution, is one of long standing, and its principles have been settled at least in their
broad outlines for many decades.").
118. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911).
119. Hicks, 485 U.S. at 631 (noting that the challenger may have to show error by "the clearest
proof').
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One effective way for the trial court to vindicate its authority upon
violation of a court order is to jail the charged party in criminal contempt for
a determinate time. Here, the complainant often effectively becomes a quasi-
prosecutor, describing how the charged party's defiance undermines the
authority of the court. The private party moving for criminal contempt often
receives no individual gain. As the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged,
though: "if the proceeding is for criminal contempt and the [punishment] is
solely punitive, to vindicate the authority of the law, the complainant may also
derive some incidental benefit from the fact that such punishment tends to
prevent a repetition of the disobedience."120
By contrast, the goal of coercive civil contempt effectuates a court's
decree. Like criminal contempt, a court may send an errant party to jail upon
finding disobedience. However, the jail time is a "conditional penalty," for
compliance with the court's order will prompt release. As a result, those in
contempt "carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets."12' The chief
purpose of coercive civil contempt is to resolve issues in an individual case,
not to aid the court as an institution.
Compensatory civil contempt is meant to benefit primarily those harmed
by violations of court orders (and perhaps other misconduct in litigation). It
is used where the benefits sought involve compensation for the harm caused
by the violations rather than future compliance with the court orders. Surely,
in some instances one harmed may seek both compensatory and coercive civil
contempt remedies.
Although federal district courts can secure compliance with their orders
through coercive civil contempt, they may also use Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 69 at times. Under Rule 69, on enforcement of judgments, courts
may order that "in aid of the judgment or execution, the judgment creditor or
a successor in interest... may obtain discovery from any person, including the
judgment debtor, in the manner provided in these rules or in the manner
provided by the practice of the state in which the district court is held."' 22 The
process to enforce judgments for the payment of money is usually governed by
state law. '23
If amendments to § 1367 went beyond the general analytical structure set
forth in Kokkonen, a revised statute could also address a few troublesome
uncertainties. Consider, for example, the ancillary power issue in Kokkonen
120. Id. at 635-36 (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443).
121. Id. at 633 (quoting Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 593 (1947)).




itself. If "the parties' obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement
agreement had been made part ofthe order of dismissal,"'24 would the Supreme
Court have recognized that federal district court power to inquire into the duty
to return the insurance files better originated within the first or the second head
of ancillary jurisdiction, assuming that such pigeonholing is important? The
distinction seems important to us, as civil claim adjudicatory procedures
prompted by initial complaints differ significantly from the procedures
appropriate when courts seek to function successfully, as through contempt
proceedings. At first blush, the second head seems most appropriate for an
inquiry into the duty of Mr. Kokkonen to return the files to Guardian, since the
court needs to "effectuate its decrees" in order for it to "function
successfully."' 25 Yet upon further thought, might not the first head be more
appropriate since the district court would be involved in the "disposition...
of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually
interdependent?"'"2 6 But for the presentation of the initial claims in the federal
district court, no settlement would have occurred; the settlement resolved all
controversies in the court over the claims initially presented. Furthermore,
judicial inquiry into Kokkonen's failure to turn over insurance files may be
mainly prompted by the desires of Guardian rather than by judicial concerns
about successful court functioning. As a result, private contract enforcement
proceedings might follow. Here, there may again be a settlement which may
not involve-or even be made known to-the district judge. Such a settlement
would then terminate the proceedings yet again upon a voluntary
dismissal-saying little about successful court functioning and making the
appearance of a criminal contempt prosecutor very unlikely.'27
If the first head of ancillary jurisdiction is more appropriate for the
insurance file issue in Kokkonen, additional questions arise. For example, are
the adjudicatory procedures germane to civil claims initially presented
different from those presented, and perhaps, only arising long after traditional
joinder laws have operated, as when settlements are arranged that effectively
124. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994).
125. Id.
126. Id. A similar question seemingly can arise with a motion for an attorney's fee award based upon
civil litigation misconduct. See, e.g., John G. Phillips & Assoc. v. Brown, 757 N.E.2d 875, 879-80 (I11.
2001) (forpurposes of timing ofappeals, such a motion presents a claim which is "inextricably interwoven
with the case" in which the motion is made).
127. The appointment of an independent prosecutor seems required as the alleged contempt by
Mr. Kokkonen is indirect (outside the trial judge's presence), thus prompting the need for judicial fact
finding following an adversarial hearing.
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prompt wholly new civil claims,'28 or when postjudgment filings add new civil
claims wholly dependent upon the judgments earlier rendered?'29
C. Differentiating Between Ancillary Federal District Court Powers
Under Kokkonen, one head of ancillary jurisdiction involves "factually
interdependent claims," while the other concerns judicial authority necessary
for courts to "function successfully," including powers used for management,
vindication, and decree effectuation. 3' While the former was codified in
§ 1367, with supplemental jurisdiction chiefly replacing, and somewhat
modifying, the earlier decisional tier embodying initial pendent and ancillary
adjudicatory power, the latter remains largely guided by precedents. We urge
that § 1367 be amended 3' to speak, at least generally, to both heads of
ancillary jurisdiction. We believe the failure, to date, to speak in written law
is founded chiefly on inattention to the framework in Kokkonen rather than on
any flaws in the framework, on any lack of need, on any projected drafting
difficulty, or on any concerns about politically divisive topics. The Kokkonen
analysis provides needed clarification on the scope of all ancillary powers as
well as guidance on their exercise.
Under Kokkonen, the two heads of ancillary jurisdiction serve distinct, but
related, purposes. In order to promote judicial efficiency and economy,
adjudicatory authority over factually interdependent claims generally
128. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 664.6 (West 2002) ("[T]he court, upon motion, may enter
judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement [agreement]."); Kirby v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 93 Cal. Rptr.
2d 223, 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (describing the statute as providing for "a summary procedure");
Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996) (settlement in state court of federal law
claims that were within exclusive federal court adjudicatoryauthority). Compare United States v. Peterson,
268 F.3d 533, 534-65 (7th Cir. 2001) (plea bargain in criminal case in which defendant agrees to pay
restitution for losses in crimes charged and for losses in similar acts which were not charged; where later
agreementon the amount can not be reached, underthe bargain the restitution amount is determined by the
court at sentencing upon considering the collected details of defendant's wrongful conduct presented by
the probation office).
129. Consider, for example, prevailing party cost recovery clauses in contracts or in statutes (as 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (2000)) that trigger rights only upon judgment entries. See, e.g., Raintree Health Ctr. v. 111.
Human Rights Comm'n, 672 N.E. 2d 1136, 1148 (I11. 996) ("[C]ourts frequently award attorney fees
without discovery.., and without holding evidentiary hearings," at least where affidavits, detailed billing
worksheets and responses thereto are submitted.).
130. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379-80.
131. While some separation of powers concerns reasonably may be raised with congressional rather
than judicial rulemaking initiatives on these other ancillary federal district court powers, we believe
Congress is competent, and in the best position, given its earlier response to Finley, to adopt general
guidelines. See infra Section IV-A.
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encompasses civil claims involving private remedies resolved under
substantive state laws. Authority promoting successful court functioning
furthers the general public interest in the just, speedy and inexpensive
determinations sought when civil actions are presented and resolved. Though
their purposes vary somewhat in practice, both heads could fit nicely within
§ 1367. Ancillary jurisdiction relating to both factually interdependent claims
and successful court functioning permit federal district courts to resolve all
matters that would "ordinarily be expected" to be resolved in "one judicial
proceeding.' ' 32 Their close relationship will be illustrated later through a
review of how all major forms of ancillary federal district court powers can
encompass issues involving recoveries of attorneys' fees. The examples also
demonstrate how easily uncertainties can arise regarding the two heads of
ancillary jurisdiction.
1. A Broader View of Factually Interdependent Claims
Section 1367 states that the federal district courts have "supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy.' 3 3 Seemingly, the statute speaks to the first head of ancillary
jurisdiction in Kokkonen, encompassing adjudicatory authority to dispose of
"factually interdependent" claims.'34
With such factually interdependent claims, there are important
distinctions, however, that now go unnoted in § 1367.' The U.S. Supreme
Court in Gibbs encouraged a broad expanse for such claims, finding that earlier
limitations involving claims that arise from "the same group of circumstances"
as in the federal claims were "unnecessarily grudging."'3 6 Instead, the Court
stated:
The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. But
if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff s claims are such
that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then,
132. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 715, 725 (1966).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
134. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1994).
135. See Matasar, supra note 27, at 1447-63 (exploring the "common nucleus" and "ordinary
expectations" language of Gibbs).
136. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724-25.
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assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the
whole. 1 7
Thus, in addition to nonfederal claims involving the very same circumstances
as the federal claims, factually interdependent claims also include nonfederal
claims with fewer factual ties to federal claims, as long as one "would
ordinarily be expected to try" all claims in one judicial proceeding. 1
3
1
In Kokkonen, the Court alludes to this broader reading of factually
interdependent claims when it says that civil claims can be factually
interdependent "in varying respects and degrees."'3 9  Further, the Court
recognizes that factually interdependent claims may be heard together because
it is "particularly efficient that they be adjudicated together."'
140
The current supplemental jurisdiction statute seemingly embodies
jurisdiction over claims under this broader reading of factually interdependent
claims because it covers related claims, not simply claims suitable for initial
adjudication because they "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact"
per Gibbs."' The statute encompasses all claims that are sufficiently related,
thus apparently including factually related claims thai are presented long ago
after the "claims in the action" (the federal claims) within "original
jurisdiction" have been resolved.' 2 Thus, the statute speaks to claims within
both initial and later adjudicatory authority.
After Gibbs, but before Kokkonen, the U.S. Supreme Court had also ruled
that ancillary power over factually interdependent claims, even those arising
from "the same group of circumstances," is less available when the claims
involve "parties not named in any claim that is independently cognizable by the
federal court," for such claims are fundamentally different. 43 Beyond factual
137. Id. at 725 (footnote omitted).
138. See also Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 355 (1996) (quoting Owen Equip. & Erection Co.
v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978)) ("The basis of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction is the practical
need 'to protect legal rights or effectively to resolve an entire, logically entwined lawsuit."'). Much legal
commentary is in accord. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, "Common Nucleus of Operative Fact" and
Defensive Set-off: Beyond the Gibbs Test, 74 IND. L.J. 171, 171 (1998) (arguing the constitutional test for
supplementary jurisdiction is broader than the "common nucleus of operative fact" test of Gibbs,
referencing earlier and agreeable academic works).
139. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379-80.
140. Id. at 380.
141. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
142. Compare Perduesupra note 5 1, at 70 (preferring"common nucleus of operative fact" language
for § 1367) with Floyd, supra note 52, at 877 (preferring an even narrower range of supplemental claims
to be covered in § 1367, since federalism as well as efficiency should matter).
143. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545,549 (1989) (footnote omitted) ("Our cases show, however,
that with respect to the addition of parties, as opposed to the addition of only claims, we will not assume
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relatedness (or "mere factual similarity") and considerations of "the
convenience of the litigants" and of "judicial economy," '144 ancillary power
over a new adverse party also requires "an examination of the posture in which
the nonfederal claim is asserted and of the specific statute that confers
jurisdiction over the federal claim. '
The federal civil procedure rule on impleader serves to illustrate both how
a factually related nonfederal claim can arise from a differing group of
circumstances as well as how explorations into postures and particular
jurisdictional statutes can limit the availability of ancillary power over a new
party even when convenience and economy are promoted. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 14(a) permits a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, to implead
a "person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to the third-party
plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the third-party
plaintiff. ' 146 For the court to entertain such a third-party claim, the district
court must find some basis for subject matter jurisdiction, since Rule 14(a)
itself cannot extend subject matter jurisdiction.'47 In many settings, the third-
party claims are nonfederal, thus falling outside any independentjurisdictional
basis. Professors Wright, Miller and Kane, in their widely used Federal
Practice treatise, suggest, however, that ancillary jurisdiction is usually
available. They write:
Because defendant's right of action against the third-party under rule 14 must be based
on the same aggregate of facts that constitute plaintiff's claim, it follows that a court
having jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim needs no additional jurisdictional ground to
determine a third-party claim springing out of the same core of facts.1
4
1
that the full constitutional power has been congressionally authorized, and will not read jurisdictional
statutes broadly.").
144. Id. at 552 (citing Kroger, 437 U.S. at 376-77).
145. Finley, 490 U.S. at 551. (CitingKroger, 437 U.S. at 373). See also U.S.I. Properties Corp. v.
M.D. Constr. Co., 230 F.3d 489,499 (1 st Cir. 2000) (noting that such an examination is required when the
new party is joined in a postjudgment proceeding seeking to establish the new party's liability for the
judgment).
146. The provision states, in pertinent part:
When a Defendant May Bring in Third Party. At any time after commencement of the action a
defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon
a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for all or part
of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff. The third-party plaintiff need not obtain
leave to make the service if the third-party plaintiff files the third-party complaint not later than 10
days after serving the original answer.
FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
148. See 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1444
(2d ed. 1990).
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Such claims are seemingly factually related, but often involve differing groups
of circumstances. Consider general diversity lawsuits arising from automobile
accidents. Often, third-party defendants are insurance companies who defend
claims found within ancillary jurisdiction. Even though contracts between
insurers and insureds involve differing circumstances than accidents between
the plaintiffs and defendants, normally one expects that both the accident
claims and the insurance coverage claims will be adjudicated in one judicial
proceeding. Further, neither Professors Wright, Miller, nor Kane, nor any
other distinguished commentators or judges, have ever suggested that posture
or the specific jurisdictional statute employed in commencing the civil action
should limit such ancillary jurisdiction.
Assuming a direct action is permitted against an insurer, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 14 also allows the original plaintiff to "assert any claim
against the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party
plaintiff" (i.e., the original defendant). 49 Yet, here, even though the claim is
factually interdependent, there is no ancillary jurisdiction under § 1367(b),
which codified the decision in Owen Equipment and Erection Co. v. Kroger.1
50
Posture and the goals within the general diversity statute foreclose ancillary
jurisdiction. 5'
While certain types of factually interdependent claims are explicitly
recognized in the joinder provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 and
in other rules on joinder,'52 not all factually related claims subject to joinder
are so recognized. Some unrecognized types may prompt very differing
inquiries into posture and Congressional intent as to ancillary jurisdiction and
thus lead to differing assessments of ancillary federal court powers. Consider,
for example, claims involving attorneys' fee recoveries that often are
unrecognized in written federal civil procedure laws.
Factually interdependent claims for attorneys' fees can include pendent
claims, as where plaintiffs pursuing federal question claims (e.g., civil rights)
149. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
150. Owen Equip. Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
151. Id. at 377 (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263,270 (1934), the court declares that the policy
underlying the complete diversity requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires strict construction). While the
original defendant did not bring suit under the general diversity statute, the original plaintiff did, and
allowing that plaintiff to sue a nondiverse third-party defendant would undercut the requirement that all
plaintiffs be diverse from all defendants.
152. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaims); FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g) (cross-claims);
and, FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (interventions as of right).
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arising out of private employment disputes simultaneously pursue factually
related state law claims (e.g., employment contract or civil rights) for which
attorneys' fees are available to prevailing parties. They can also include some
ancillary claims, as where original defendants pursue factually related state law
claims against third-party defendants (e.g., insurance contracts) for attorneys'
fees. Less frequently discussed, and thus recognized, are attorneys' liens
presented by attorneys for claimants against defendants to secure payments
from the defendants for the legal services rendered to the claimants. An
Illinois statute, operative in federal district courts,' is demonstrative in that
it allows attorneys to initiate liens in pending civil actions on claims "placed
in their hands by their clients for suit" in order to cover the fees, expenses and
costs involved in pursuing the claims; it then permits trial courts to adjudicate
rights and enforce liens.' Such liens are factually related to the pending civil
claims since the attorney's work must be done in, or in anticipation of, the
pending lawsuit. Comparably, non-lien presentations of requests for attorneys'
fee awards by attorneys against clients (past or present)' 5 or perhaps others'
may be recognized within ancillary federal district court jurisdiction.
Similarly, there maybe factually interdependent claims that involve clients
seeking to avoid paying attorney's fees to their attorneys because of poor legal
153. See, e.g., Musikoffv. Jay Parrino's The Mint, L.L.C., 796 A. 2d 866 (N.J. 2002) (discussing
the certification issue under the state attorney's lien act to the state high court for resolution).
154. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1 (2002). The statute provides in pertinentpart:
Attorneys at law shall have a lien upon all claims, demands and causes of action.., which may be
placed in their hands by their clients for suit or collection.., for the amount of any fee which may
have been agreed upon by and between such attorneys and their clients, or, in the absence of such
agreement, for a reasonable fee, for the services of such suits, claims, demands or causes of action,
plus costs and expenses .... Such lien shall attach to any verdict, judgment or order entered...
from and after the time of service of the notice. On petition filed by such attorneys or their clients
any court of competent jurisdiction shall... adjudicate the rights of the parties and enfbrce the lien.
A case illustrating the operation of the statute is People v. Philip Morris, Inc., 759 N.E.2d 906 (I1. 2001).
155. See, e.g., In re Private Counsel Agreement, 1999 WL 1022131 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (employing the
Gibbs factually related claims analysis, the court finds: "Every federal appeals court addressing the issue
has concluded that as a general matter an attorney's fees dispute meets the relatedness test for supplemental
jurisdiction." Id. at 3. Yet the court recognizes there is no supplemental jurisdiction over a fee dispute
involving an attorney who voluntarily withdraws from representation for fee nonpayment); Kalyawongsa
v. Moffett, 105 F.3d 283, 286-88 (6th Cir. 1997) (reviewing cases wherein supplemental jurisdiction is
exercised overattorneys' fees disputes, not involving coxnmon funds and arising under state contract laws,
that are factually related "to the main action"). Id. at 287.
156. See, e.g., Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82 (1990) (stating that attorneys may be assigned, and
can pursuedireetly postjudgment, their civil rights clients' statutory rights to attorneys' fees from defending
parties). Compare Flannery v. Prentice, 28 P.3d 860 (Cal. 2001) (holding that the state statute allowing
"prevailing party" to seek reasonable attorneys' fees read to vest ownership of fees in counsel for winning
party in California Fair Employment and Housing Act claim, in absence of any attorney-client agreement).
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work performed in the very civil actions in which these fee disputes are
presented, and in which attorneys' fee awards may also be requested by the
attorneys. Further, two or more attorneys for a single client in a pending
federal civil action may themselves litigate, in that very action, any disputes
over distributions of attorneys' fees. For example, an earlier retained, but now
dismissed, contingency fee attorney may seek some fee recovery from a present
contingency fee attorney.
For many of these factually interdependent civil claims involving
attorneys' fees, there are no federal civil procedure rules or other written
federal laws on joinder. And there is no indication in § 1367 of either ancillary
jurisdiction or of the guidelines on their use.
2. Ancillary Powers Needed for Courts to Function Successfully
a. The Power to Effectuate Decrees
To function successfully, federal courts can employ ancillary powers to
"effectuate" decrees. In Kokkonen, the Supreme Court indicated that federal
district courts could police civil case settlement agreements incorporated into
court judgments or otherwise specifically retained for possible later
jurisdiction.' Such oversight often occurs through contempt proceedings,
similar to oversights of judgments founded on judge or jury decisions.
The limits on such ancillary power are unclear. It is apparent, however,
that the power to effectuate decrees is usually limited to a proceeding against
someone adjudged liable earlier in a court order. It does not extend to others
who may be responsible for failures of compliance with court orders. In
Peacock v. Thomas,' a worker successfully sued his former insolvent
employer under ERISA for recovery of pension benefits. While the case was
on appeal, and prior to judgment execution, a company officer settled company
accounts with creditors, including an $80,000 debt owed to that officer. When
the worker was unable to execute the judgment later, he sued the company
officer for the entire judgment amount. The U.S. Supreme Court, while
acknowledging Kokkonen, found its analysis inapplicable.5 9 The company
officer was not involved in the original judgment and was not found liable in
a court order. The Court explained that it had never authorized the exercise of
157. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380-82.
158. Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349 (1996).
159. Id. at 356, 359.
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ancillary power in a later proceeding to impose an obligation to pay an earlier
judgment on a person not earlier deemed liable for thatjudgment.60 Thus, the
Court limited decree effectuation to the parties and their privies.''
When effectuating decrees, issues of attorneys' fees must sometimes be
resolved. Thus, a civil case settlement agreement prompting a judgment can
require certain payments by a defendant to a plaintiff. Upon an alleged breach,
a later judicial inquiry involving compensatory civil contempt can include a
plaintiff's request for fees tied to the enforcement efforts, where the settlement
expressly provided for such fee recovery. Similarly, where an agreement on
an earlier-noticed attorneys' lien is incorporated into a judgment, with later
dispute resolution and court enforcement possible, an issue as to the
reasonableness of the fees requested can arise later, where the agreement was
to pay only reasonable fees. Finally, a civil case judgment may prompt a
general fee award founded on civil litigation misconduct that later requires
enforcement where, for example, disputes arise over the reasonableness of the
fees sought for defending against the acts of litigation misconduct.
b. The Power to Vindicate Authority
Disobedience of court orders which do not resolve civil claims or cases
(e.g., failure of a witness, party, or attorney to appear at hearings or at
discovery proceedings) may be addressed through the ancillary power to
vindicate judicial authority. Similarly, vindication authority may be used
where there is no court order, but where there is disrespect or some other
wrongful conduct during civil litigation. Such vindication can be pursued even
in a setting where there is no applicable statute, court rule or other written law.
When vindicating authority, issues regarding attorneys' fees may arise.
For example, federal district courts must usually find bad faith before assessing
160. Id. at359. The Court did not address whether ancillary jurisdiction would have been permitted
had the worker "intended merely ... to preserve and force payment of the ERISA judgment by voiding
fraudulent transfers" of the judgment debtor's assets. Id. at 357 n.6.
161. See, e.g., U.S.I. Prop. Corp., 230 F.3d at 498 ("[W]here a postjudgment proceeding presents an
attempt simplyto collect ajudgment dulyrendered by a federal court, even if chasing afterthe assets of the
judgment debtor now in the hands of a third party, the residual jurisdiction stemming from the court's
authority to render that judgment is sufficient to provide for federal jurisdiction over the post-judgment
claim .... However, where that postjudgment proceeding presents a new substantive theory to establish
liability directly on the part of a new party, some independent ground is necessary to assume federal
jurisdiction over the claim, since such a claim is no longer a mere continuation of the original action.").
Postjudgment proceedings involving new parties but relating to judgment collection can include
proceedings involving "attachment, mandamus, gamishment," and the avoidance of fraudulent
conveyances. Peacock, 516 U.S. at 356, 357 n.6.
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attorneys' fees for litigation misconduct, assuming absence of an applicable
written law. 62 While such a fee award usually operates on behalf of a civil
litigant and against an adverse party or an attorney, and thus benefits private
interests, a major goal behind such an award typically involves the general
public interest in according proper respect to judges and judicial proceedings.
Ancillary power to vindicate judicial authority was employed in Chambers
v. Nasco, Inc. 63 where the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated that, pursuant to its
inherent power, a federal district court could assess attorneys' fees when a
party or an attorney acted during civil litigation either in willful disobedience
of a court order 164 or in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons. 16 Such assessments may even be made when a party's or an
attorney's relevant acts could have been addressed through sanctions in some
way under a written court rule or statute, but where the written laws were not
fully"up to the task"''66 and no written laws limited the ancillarypower.167 Yet,
where there are adequate written laws on point, only they should be employed
in vindication proceedings. 1
68
162. At times, written laws require conduct approaching the bad faith needed in common law
ancillary vindication power settings. See, e.g., Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421
(1978) (prevailing defendants receive attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 only upon a finding "that the
plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation").
163. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
164. Id. at 45 (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258 (1975).
165. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45-46 (citing Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258-5 9). The inherent federal court
power to sanction an attorney in the absence of"a violation of a court order" may not require a finding of
bad faith where the attorney's acts were "not undertaken for the client's benefit." United States v. Seltzer,
227 F.3d 36,41-42 (2d Cir. 2000). Bad faith conduct may include, however, reckless acts "when combined
with an additional factor, such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose." Fink v. Gomez, 239
F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2001).
166. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50.
167. Id. at 47 (holding that inherent federal court power may be limited by statute or court rule as
federal courts are created by Congress). See, e.g., id. at 51 (citing Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,
487 U.S. 250, 254-55 (1988) (where the clear mandate of a criminal procedure rule limited supervisory
power)). But see CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.2.3 (Hornbook Series, Student ed.
1986) (recognizing "negative inherent powers"doctrine disallows legislative override at least where written
laws would directly and substantially impair judicial authority to adjudicate cases and conduct other
necessary business).
168. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50 ("Furthermore, when there is bad-faith conduct in the course of
litigation that could be adequately sanctioned under the Rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the Rules
rather than the inherent power.").
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c. The Power to Manage Proceedings
For a federal district court to function successfully, it must be able, at
times, to exercise powers to manage its proceedings. While the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure seek to promote "the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action," '169 additional ancillary management powers to
avoid unnecessary delays or expense are essential. As the Supreme Court
noted in Link, "the district court's ability to take action in a procedural context
may be considered an 'inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by
the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to
achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."' 70 As courts manage
their proceedings, issues of attorneys' fees sometimes must be resolved.
One of the tools available for managing the ever-increasing workloads in
the federal district courts is the special master. Special masters may be
appointed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 in order to assist a federal
judge in the administration of a complex or lengthy civil action."' For
instance, a master can be appointed to oversee class action discovery,' 72 to
assist in the enforcement of a final judgment embodying a broad injunction,'
7 3
or to help determine difficult issues on damages.'74 The reference of masters
is limited to case settings involving exceptional conditions.' The
compensation of a master is set by the court, which may order it paid by any
of the parties or out of a fund within the subject matter of the civil action.'76
If the party ordered to pay refuses, "the master is entitled to a writ of execution
against the delinquent party."'77
While masters may be attorneys, the procedures for their fee assessments
should differ significantly from the procedures for attorneys' fees assessments
in other ancillary power settings. A fee assessment for a master reflects the
169. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
170. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962).
171. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
172. Aird v. Ford Motor Co., 86 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
173. Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1979) (appointing special master to
oversee the implementation of a desegregation plan).
174. S. Agency Co. v. LaSalle Casualty Co., 393 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1968) (an accounting finn was
appointed as a special master to assist in assessing damages in a case involving a breach of an insurance
agency agreement).
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a). See, e.g., David I. Levine, Calculating Fees of Special Masters, 37
HASTINGS L.J. 141 (1985).
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a).
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cost of obtaining assistance for the court, aiding all involved in the civil action.
As the court said in A ird v. Ford Motor Company7 ' after reviewing Federal
Civil Procedure Rule 53 and inherent authority, a district court "enjoys broad
discretion to allocate [fees]"' 79 and a "court's ability to manage its docket and
enforce the discovery rules... may depend greatly on its power to allocate the
costs of reference as it deems appropriate."''8
0
IV. NEW SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION STATUTE
A. Who Should Write It?
There is much to be said for assigning Congress the task of filling in the
ancillary power gaps, given § 1367 and the broad authority of Congress
pursuant to its Article III powers to define the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal district courts.'' In another context, Professor Fink has observed:
"Supplemental jurisdiction is the unused weapon in Congress' arsenal to solve
national litigation problems in the federal courts."'82 Yet, is Congress in the
best position to lawmake?
We think so.' 83 Congress should supplement § 1367, using Supreme Court
precedents, especially the 1994 decision in Kokkonen. Professor Oakley
recognized the value of statutory guidance on supplemental jurisdiction in an
ALI draft in which he wrote:
By swiftly supplying comprehensive statutory authority for the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction, present § 1367 prevented the seepage of authority to adjudicate supplemental
state-law claims in the pendent-party, exclusive-federal-jurisdiction context of Finley from
becominga ruinous flood, depleting a reservoir of long-accumulated precedent permitting
178. Aird, 86 F.3d at 225.
179. Id. at 221.
180. Id. at 222 (citing Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 314-15 (1920) (agreeing with district judge's
decision to appoint an auditor to help define the matters in issue)).
181. Of course, congressional action should proceed cautiously. As a drafter of § 1367 has noted:
"Wooden interpretive approaches with heavy emphasis on plain language-whatever the apparent
legislative intent-increase the possibility that any gap or ambiguity will have unintended consequences
(be they fortunate or otherwise)." Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., 1367 and All That: Recodifying Federal
Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 IND. L.J. 53, 56 (1998).
182. Howard P. Fink, SupplementalJurisdiction-Take It to theLimit!, 74 IND. L.J. 161, 169 (1998)
(discussing how the elimination of § 13 67(b) would give federal courts more power to resolve certain types
of mass tort and complex business cases).




federal courts to achieve the fair and efficient, holistic disposition of complex, multi-claim
and multi-party litigation.'84
A similar congressional initiative could promote better exercises of the
"function successfully" forms of ancillary federal district court powers. Even
Professor David L. Shapiro, who urges that refinements of federal subject
matter jurisdiction generally are "best left to 'common law' development,"
declares that Congress should enact "a law establishing the principle of
supplemental jurisdiction, and then. .. leave all or most of the details to be
worked out by the courts."' 85 We think general statutory guidelines on all
forms of ancillary federal court powers should be established, with the details
to be worked out in common law rulings. Regardless of who speaks, however,
more should be said in written laws about ancillary federal court powers.
B. What Should Be Said?
The major difficulty with § 1367 today is its failure to address both heads
of ancillary jurisdiction, making it more difficult for the Article III federal
courts to work out the details. We propose new statutory guidelines on the
scope of ancillary powers and on the discretion to hear claims and other
matters under the factually interdependent and function successfully heads of
ancillary jurisdiction. These guidelines should be included in a broader § 1367
and not in several distinct statutes. Section 1367 should then become the
primary resource employed by judges, lawyers and others exploring ancillary
federal district court powers.
Too often today, the lack of statutory guidelines, especially for the
"function successfully" ancillary powers, contributes to limited recognition of
discretionary federal district court authority. For example, in In re Novak, I6
a federal appeals court determined that in the absence of federal rules or
statutes, the district court lacked the power to compel a nonparty insurer to
participate in a settlement conference though the insurer was directing the
defenses to the claims. It said there was no available inherent power because
184. ALl TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 82, at 16.
185. Shapiro, supra note 92, at 218. In proposing an expansion of § 1367, we agree with Professor
Shapiro that such an effort should (and we believe it can) "avoid the growing disposition to make the
jurisdictional charter of the federal courts resemble the murkier provisions of the Internal Reveue Code."
Id. at 220. Should only the broad parameters of the entire realm of ancillaryjurisdiction be deemed suitable
for congressional initiative, we hope the following suggestions will be employed by the federal courts who
fill in the gaps.
186. In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1407-08 (11th Cir. 1991).
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the attendance of the nonparty insurer was not necessary to obtain a
settlement," 7 although it seems clear that an insurer's attendance at a
settlement conference would often aid the parties in reaching resolution. To
function successfully, federal courts should be encouraged to employ very
helpful, as well as absolutely necessary, powers.
U.S. Supreme Court precedents, as well as the history of § 1367 in
combatting confusion, support statutory clarification of ancillary federal
district court powers since uncertainties have arisen. In its absence, many may
follow Justice Scalia, who observed that federal district courts "possess only
that power authorized by Constitution and statute . . . which is not to be
expanded by judicial decree."' 88 While federal legislation certainly cannot
extend federal judicial powers beyond those constitutionally permitted,
Congress can and should clarify the scope of ancillary powers when
uncertainties arise, as Congress did with some factually interdependent claims
when it enacted § 1367 in 1990.
A common criticism of Professor Oakley's first draft of a revised § 1367
was that it was too unwieldy for practical use.'89 As a result, Professor Oakley
altered his approach to § 1367 revisions "in order to achieve greater economy
of exposition."'' 9' A revision of § 1367 that incorporates the two heads of
ancillary jurisdiction can be economical and need not be "prolix and
baroque."''9 An amendment could employ the analysis in Kokkonen, 92 with
limited explanations of the varying forms of ancillary powers. A new § 1367
statute could provide greater guidance while maintaining the flexibility and
discretion necessary for the federal district courts to resolve factually related
claims and to determine issues efficiently and fairly in order to function
successfully.
To reinforce the practice-oriented structure of § 1367, the statute should
delineate between the varying forms of factually interdependent claims and
between the ancillary powers allowing courts to function successfully, namely,
the effectuation, vindication, and management powers. These delineations
should prompt lawyers and judges to consider the goals, and thus the
appropriate procedures, of any exercises of ancillary power. In particular, a
187. Id. at 1408 (while inherent power was unnecessary as to insurance adjuster Novak because his
presence could be secured by an order against his principal, the defendant/insured, it would be different
where there was tension (e.g., as to insurance policy coverage) between the insured and the insurer).
188. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
189. See ALl TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 82, at ix.
190. Id. at xviii.
191. Rowe et al., A Reply, supra note 72, at 961.
192. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379-80.
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new § 1367 would enable all to "be able to understand clearly and in advance
the tools that are available to them in ensuring swift and certain compliance
with valid court orders."'
' 93
As noted, there are varying forms of "factually interdependent" nonfederal
claims within ancillary federal district court powers. Nonfederal claims may
be initially presented for adjudication with federal claims as long as all claims
arose from "the same group of circumstances."'' 94 Such nonfederal claims are
now recognized by all as addressed in § 1367. Yet there are other nonfederal
claims, with lesser factual ties, that may also be presented. These nonfederal
claims, often presented later, may be adjudicated if all claims "would
ordinarily be expected" to be tried "in one judicial proceeding."'9'5 Seemingly,
such lesser-connected nonfederal claims also include claims grounded on liens
attaching to later judgments that are presented early in the civil action and to
many claims for attorneys' compensation,' 96 including those derived from
contingency fee pacts between personal injury claimants and their lawyers.
"Factually interdependent" nonfederal claims with lesser factual ties to the
federal claims initially presented for adjudication may also include the claims
for civil claim settlement enforcement recognized in Kokkonen. Here, any
adjudication may come long after the federal claims were resolved. But
ancillary power is nevertheless appropriate because of efficiency concerns and
reasonable party and judicial expectations.
Beyond ancillary adjudicatory powers over the varying forms of "factually
interdependent" claims, ancillary federal district court powers involving
effectuation, vindication and management warrant some explicit mention in
§ 1367. As to the enforcement powers necessary to function successfully,
§ 1367 could follow Kokkonen to indicate that in order for a trial court to
enforce a settlement agreement, it may include "the terms of the settlement
contract ... in the order.., or, what has the same effect, retain jurisdiction
over the settlement contract."' 97 In addition, language should be added to
§ 1367 to indicate there are other opportunities for ancillary enforcement
powers, as when there is disobedience to judgments founded on bench or jury
193. Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 636 (1985).
194. See, e.g., Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 375.
195. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
196. While there is federal judicial power to hear factually-related nonfederal claims involving
attorneys' fees, there is also broad discretion on whether or not such power should be exercised. See, e.g.,
Ryther v. KARE II, 976 F. Supp. 853, 857 (D. Minn. 1997) (factors guiding this discretion include court's
familiaritywith subject matter; court's responsibility to protect its officers; convenience; and, whether there
is a compelling reason for the federal court to decline to act, as where state law precedents are unclear).
197. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381-82.
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trials or to collateral orders involving vindication or management efforts.
Many of these ancillary enforcement proceedings may have many comparable
procedures, usually involving contempt hearings. 9 '
As to the management powers necessary to "function successfully,"
§ 1367 should address only one of the two types of court management. A
"judicial administration" or "superintending control" management order often
involves an administrative undertaking by a Chief or Presiding Judge related
to the day-to-day management of the trial court.'99 These orders involve such
matters as calendaring, judicial assignments, and office or hiring procedures.
They do not fit within § 1367. Other court management orders, dealing with
the management of a pending case, were noted in Kokkonen. °° These case
management orders can involve such matters as the appointment of a special
master, the use of a federal magistrate judge, or the assignment of a trial court
judge. They fit within § 1367.
Finally, as to ancillary vindication powers,2"' the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corporation"' provides useful
guidelines. There the Court discussed the Federal Civil Procedure Rule 11
postjudgment sanctioning authority for civil litigation misconduct involving
written presentations. The appellate court had said that
because Rule 11 sanctions served to punish and deter, they secured the proper functioning
of the legal system "independent of the burdened party's interest in recovering its
expenses." Accordingly . . . such sanctions must "be available in appropriate
circumstances notwithstanding a private party's effort to cut its losses and run out of
cour" 203
The Supreme Court agreed that the district court's power to vindicate its
authority transcends the interests of the individual parties and extends beyond
the time of party involvement in a civil action. New language in § 1367 could
limit the narrow interpretations occasionally given ancillary vindication
powers, as when they are applied only in active cases. Even where a case is
198. Procedures may differ, for example, where there is a constitutional or statutory right to trial of
factual issues by a jury.
199. See, e.g., OHio CONST. art. IV, § 5(A)(1) (supreme court "general superintendence" power to
be "exercised by the chief justice" in accordance with supreme court rules); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16
("[G]eneral administrativeand supervisory authorityoverall courts is vested in the Supreme Court and shall
be exercised by the Chief Justice" in accordance with court rules.).
200. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.
201. Id.
202. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
203. Id. at 390 (quoting Danik, Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp., 875 F.2d 890, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
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dismissed, its filing "puts the machinery of justice in motion," at times
"burdening the courts and individuals alike with needless expense and
delay."204  So, notwithstanding a dismissal of all claims presented for
adjudication, ancillary vindication power may be exercised.
C. Coordination With Other Written Laws
In any revisions to § 1367 there must be coordination with other written
laws as well as proper regard for judicial precedents. Several other statutes,
as well as a number of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seemingly address
ancillary federal district court powers to hear "factually interdependent" claims
and to "function successfully." For example, one federal statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927, allows courts to assess excessive costs, expenses and attorneys' fees
on attorneys who multiply proceedings "unreasonably and vexatiously.
25
And, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 37 provide for monetary
assessments when deficient civil litigation papers are presented, though they
contain standards very different from each other,2"6 from § 1927, and from the
ancillary vindication power case precedents.20 7
While coordination of an amended § 1367 with existing statutes and rules
is important, comprehensive cross-references seem neither necessary nor
feasible. Indeed, one major criticism of the current § 1367(b) is its "use of
specified joinder rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the basis for
restricting the scope of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases.""2 ° By
specifically mentioning certain rules or statutes, § 1367 may restrict
jurisdictional exercises under other written laws, a form of expressio unius est
204. Id. at 398.
205. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994). The statute provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any
Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may
be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
206. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 1 1(c)(2) (stating that nondiscovery sanctions are limited to those
"sufficient to deter repetition"), and FED. R. Civ. P. 37(bX2) (stating that the court "shall" order payment
of "reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees" for discovery-related misconduct).
207. See, e.g., Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 33 (1990) (stating that inherent powerextends
to full range of litigation abuses, but willful, bad faith, or similar acts are needed for power to be used).
208. ALl TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 82, at 17. See also John B. Oakley, Joinder and
Jurisdiction in the Federal District Courts: The State of the Union ofRules and Statutes, 69 TENN. L. REV.
35, 37 (2001) ("Union of rules and statutes in current law of supplemental jurisdiction" is not a healthy
one.).
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exclusio alterius.2 °9 And consider, for example, supplemental jurisdiction to
enforce civil claim settlements in diversity cases under the principles of
Kokkonen where there is no joinder at all. We suggest that a new § 1367
should reference only generally the range of ancillary federal district court
powers, without mentioning any particular joinder laws. The structure of
Kokkonen would work well.
The new ancillary jurisdiction provisions we propose for § 1367 should
be general and should complement, rather than supercede, existing rules and
statutes. Some existing rules and statutes touching differing forms of ancillary
federal district court powers do reveal some unnecessary duplication and
unfortunate omissions. Once the general structure of ancillary jurisdiction is
set out in a new § 1367, amendments to related written civil procedure laws
should follow.
For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69 now seemingly provides
guidance on ancillary powers over certain "factually interdependent" claims
and on the enforcement prong of the "function successfully" ancillary power.
The rule specifically provides for the enforcement of a judgment by a writ of
execution as well as for opportunities to undertake related discovery.2"' Yet
the rule is incomplete. Kokkonen makes it quite clear that a federal district
court may only enforce terms of a settlement if the terms are set out, or at least
referenced, in the final judgment.2 t' Federal district courts seemingly remain
confused today on the technique(s) for recognizing such future enforcement
power."2 Recognition of the proper technique in Rule 69 would help to
eliminate uncertainty.2"3
209. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168
(1993) (applying canons of statutory interpretation to interpret the pleading requirements of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 9(b)).
210. FED. R. Civ. P. 69.
211. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994).
212. See, e.g., Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding it unusual that a
settlement agreement was submitted to and approved by the district judge though ancillary enforcement
power was not retained and wondering whether the trial judge was merely "a kibitzer"); Consumers Gas
& Oil v. Farmland Ind., 84 F.3d 367, 371 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that though district court reserved
"continuingjurisdiction" overa settlement, where only some settlement terms are set forth in a court order,
other terms may not be subject to enforcement proceedings). Compare Schaefer Fan Co. v. J&D Mfg., 60
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (establishing that enforcement jurisdiction is proper where trial judge
manifests "intent to retain jurisdiction" over settlement) with O'Connor v. Colvin, 70 F.3d 530, 532 (9th
Cir. 1995) ("Even a district court's expressed intention to retain jurisdiction is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction if that intention is not expressed in the order of dismissal.").
213. There are otherquestions which might also be considered. See, e.g., Pure Fishing, Inc. v. Silver
Star Co., 202 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N. D. Iowa 2002) (indicating circumstances requiring personal jurisdiction




Ancillary federal district court powers embody more than adjudicatory
authority over "factually interdependent" civil claims initially presented within
cases or controversies. Ancillary powers are used to facilitate civil case
settlement agreements encompassing claims never presented for adjudication,
as well as to adjudicate some disputes over settlement agreements long after
final judgments. While certain ancillary powers are now recognized in the
"supplemental jurisdiction" statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the range of the statute
is quite limited. It chiefly codifies earlier precedents on pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction that primarily address initial ancillary adjudicatory authority over
state law civil claims without independent jurisdictional bases that arise from
the same "common nucleus of operative facts" as the civil claims having
independent subject matter jurisdictional bases. Section 1367 should provide
clarity for all federal court ancillary powers, eliminating much uncertainty and
confusion.
Section 1367 should be amended to encompass more fully ancillary
adjudicatory and nonadjudicatory federal court authority. This task is
facilitated by the 1994 decision in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance
Company of America. A reformulated statute should speak for the first time
to the ancillary nonadjudicatory powers necessary for courts to function
successfully, including management, vindication, and certain enforcement
powers. And, it should better recognize the differences between initial and
later ancillary adjudicatory powers over nonfederal civil claims that are
factually related to federal civil claims. In the absence of congressional action,
judicial decisions should better recognize and differentiate the varying forms
of ancillary federal district court powers.
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